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In May, 1951, Christine McKennon began working at the Nashville
Banner, first as an ad taker, and later as a secretary.' McKennon's performance
in her various positions was consistently rated excellent.2 However, in
October, 1990, the Banner terminated McKennon after thirty years of service,
claiming a reduction in the work force.3
McKennon, who was sixty-two years old at the time of her discharge,
brought an age discrimination suit against the Banner under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)4 in May, 1991. 5 Although
McKennon seemed to have a strong case, the tables were turned when, during
her deposition, the Banner discovered that she had copied confidential company
documents that related to the Banner's financial condition. 6 McKennon had
access to the documents while she served as secretary to the Banner's
comptroller and had taken them home and shown them to her husband. 7
McKennon claimed that she was apprehensive about being let go by the Banner
because of her age and that she had taken the documents for purposes of
insurance and protection.8 Upon discovering this evidence, the Banner sent
McKennon a second termination letter, refiring her for violating company
policy. 9
Based on the newly discovered evidence, the Banner moved for summary
judgment, claiming that the company would have fired McKennon immediately
upon discovering her unlawful acts. 10 The Banner, admitting to age
discrimination for summary judgment purposes, claimed that McKennon's
conduct was legitimate grounds for termination and that she was barred from
I McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 539, 540 (6th Cir. 1993),
rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).
2 Id.
3 McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 797 F. Supp. 604, 605 (M.D. Tenn.
1992), aff'd, 9 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 1993), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).
4 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).





10 Id. at 541.
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any recovery under the ADEA because she would have been discharged.' The
district court, applying the after-acquired evidence doctrine of Swnmers v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 12 granted the Banner's motion,
finding that McKennon had suffered no injury because of her misconduct. 13
The decision was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit.14
The United States Supreme Court granted McKennon's petition for
certiorari, in order to resolve the conflict among the circuits surrounding the
use of after-acquired evidence in discrimination cases.' 5 The Supreme Court
joined the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits' refusal to follow the Swnmers
approach to after-acquired evidence. 16 The Court held that the Swmners rule
was wrong because evidence discovered after-the-fact could never be a
legitimate motive for an employment decision. 17 As the primary objective of
federal antidiscrimination laws such as Title VII 8 and the ADEA19 is to stop
unlawful discrimination, 20 and the secondary objective of such legislation is to
make the victim whole,21 the Court found that the use of after-acquired
evidence to nullify liability for discrimination weakens the deterrent value of
these laws.22 The Supreme Court, while rejecting the use of after-acquired
evidence as a complete defense to discrimination, did find such evidence
relevant at the remedies stage of a suit.23 The Court held that back pay, the
11Id.
12 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that after-acquired evidence, which is
evidence of employee misconduct brought to light after a discrimination suit has begun,
precludes any claim of plaintiffs injury), overrded by McKennon v. Nashville Banner
Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).
13 McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 797 F. Supp. 604, 608 (M.D.
Tenn. 1992), aft'd, 9 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 1993), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).
14 McKennon, 9 F.3d at 543.
15 McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 883.
16 See, e.g., Kristufek v. Hussmann Food Serv. Co., 985 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993);
Wallace v. Dum Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992), vacated, 32 F.3d 1489
(1994).
17McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 885.
18 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
19 Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V
1993).
20 See Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) (holding that one
purpose of these laws was to "make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of
unlawful employment discrimination").
21 Id. at 419 (holding that the compensation of injured parties is also an important Title
VII objective).
22 McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 884.
23 Id. at 885-86.
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most common remedy given in employment discrimination cases, 24 should be
granted to a wronged employee generally up until the date that the employer
discovered the employee's misconduct;25 to limit back pay to this date, the
employer must show that the misconduct was material enough to lead to
termination.26 However, the prospective remedies of front pay and
reinstatement were not to be granted to a wrongdoing employee, as an
employer should not be forced to rehire an employee who would have been,
and will be, terminated. 27
The after-acquired evidence doctrine is an area of the law that has been
subject to much confusion and disagreement. Because of the many important
aspects of the after-acquired evidence doctrine, this Note focuses on the use of
such evidence through analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in McKennon.
Part I of this Note will discuss the background of federal antidiscrimination
law, focusing on the standards created by the United States Supreme Court in
discrimination cases. 28 Part II details the origins of the after-acquired evidence
doctrine, tracing its development through federal case law. Part M of this Note
will then focus on the Supreme Court's resolution of the problem, explaining
why its method is the best way to deal with after-acquired evidence.
I. FEDERAL ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
In the past thirty years, equal treatment of individuals has become a
paramount concern in our society. The United States government decided to
help the equalization process by passing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,29 which prohibits employers from discriminating based on race, sex,
color, religion, or national origin.30 The ADEA, modeled after Title VII and
24 SeeAlbernare, 422 U.S. at 421.
25 McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 886.
261d.
271d.
28 See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
29 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, § 701, 78 Stat. 253 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000oe-2000oe-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
30 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a):
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refus to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin, or
1995]
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passed just three years later in 1967,31 made it unlawful for employers to
discriminate on the basis of age.32 Title VII and the ADEA share similar
language, goals, and prohibitions; the Supreme Court has noted in several
opinions that the statutes should be similarly construed. 3 3 The purposes of
these statutes are deterrence of discriminatory employment practices and
compensation of injured employees. 34 Both statutes are administered by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).35
The ADEA differs from Title VII, however, in its remedial aspects; 36 the
ADEA remedies were modeled after those of the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938 (FLSA). 37 Remedies available under the ADEA include reinstatement,
back pay, declaratory and injunctive relief, liquidated damages, and attorney's
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunity
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
3 1 See Suzanne M. Boris, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act: A Case Study,
58 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 877, 880 (1990). The author notes that the ADEA was passed in
order to grant older workers the same protection as women and minorities received under
Title VII. Id.
32 Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1988):
It shall be unlawful for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this chapter.
Id.
33 See, e.g., Oscar Mayer Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979) (noting that the
ADEA and Title VII share the common purpose of eradicating discrimination); Lorillard v.
Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978) (stating that "the prohibitions of the ADEA were derived in
haec verba from Title VII").
34 See Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975).
35 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1988); 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1988).
36 See Kimberlye K. Fayssoux, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
and Trial By Jwy: Proposals for Oange, 73 VA. L. REV. 601, 607 (1987).
37 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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fees. 38 However, under Title VII, the ADEA, and the FLSA, a private litigant
has the right to sue to enforce his or her rights, 39 and back pay has become
presumptively granted in discrimination suits under these statutes as a way to
make plaintiffs whole.40 After the antidiscrimination laws were enacted, the
United States Supreme Court developed two different methods of analysis for
discrimination claims: the pretext, or single-motive model, and the mixed-
motive model. 41 Discrimination can be proven through either direct or indirect
evidence.42 Pretext cases involve the use of indirect, circumstantial evidence to
create a prima facie case of liability, while mixed-motive cases rely on direct
evidence of discrimination to create both a prima facie case of discrimination
and liability.43 The burdens on the parties vary, depending on the type of case
at issue.44
A pretext case is one in which a single motive, whether legitimate or
discriminatory, caused the employer to make an employment decision
regarding an employee or applicant.45 The Supreme Court has developed a
three-part test for burden-shifting between the parties in pretext cases. 46 First,
the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination, which creates a
presumption of unlawful discrimination. 47 The burden of a prima facie case is
not onerous, 48 and what is needed to meet it varies with the facts of the case.49
38 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988).
39 See 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-5(f); 29 U.S.C. § 626(c); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
40 See Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975).
41 lJason M. Weinstein, No Harm, No Fold? The Use of After-Arcqdred Evidence in
Thte VI FploymentDiscmnzinadon Cases, 62 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 280, 283-84 (1993).
42 Gian Brown, Employee Misconduct and the Affinnatve Defense of After-Acquired
Evidence, 62 FORDHAM L. Ray. 381, 387 (1993) (noting that plaintiffs are more likely to
rely on indirect evidence because blatant discriminatory policies by an employer are rare
today).
43 Id. at 387-89.
44 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 230 (1989) (noting that the pretext
case burden-shifting regime was inapplicable in mixed-motive cases).
45 Weinstein, supra note 41, at 282, n.9.
46 See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
47 Id. at 802. The prima facie case can be made by a showing that 1) the plaintiff
belongs to a protected class, 2) the plaintiff was qualified and applied for a job for which the
employer was taking applications, 3) the plaintiff was rejected, and 4) after the plaintiff's
rejection, the position was still open, and other applicants were being considered. Id.
48 Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (noting
that the purpose of a prima facie case was to eliminate the most common nondiscriminatory
reasons for rejection).
49 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
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After a prima facie case has been established, the burden shifts to the
employer to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment
decision.50 However, the burden of persuasion always remains with the
plaintiff,51 and the employer must give only a simple reason for its decision in
order to rebut the discrimination claim.52 Once the employer provides a reason
for its decision, the plaintiff must show that the employer's reason was actually
a pretext for discrimination; 53 the plaintiff must persuade the court that the
discrimination was intentional.54
A mixed-motive case is one in which several factors, both legitimate and
discriminatory, motivated the employer to decide as it did.55 The method for
finding discrimination in such cases was first articulated by the Supreme Court
in Mt. Healthy Ciy School District Board of Education v. Doyle,56 an
employment discrimination suit brought on constitutional grounds. 57 The initial
burden in mixed-motive cases is on the plaintiff to show that his or her
protected conduct was a motivating factor in the employment decision;58 the
employer then carries the burden of persuasion to prove that the same decision
would have been made despite the employee's engagement in the protected
conduct.59 If the employer can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
an employee's performance was such that he or she would have been fired
anyway, then the employee would be entitled to no relief. 60
The Mt. Healthy "same decision" test was found applicable to Title VII
cases in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,61 a gender discrimination case. The
Court held in Price Waterhouse that the plaintiff must show that her status as a
member of a protected class was a "motivating factor" in the employment
decision, and only then would the burden shift to the employer to prove that
the same decision would have been made.62 If the employer can successfully
50 Id.
5 1 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
52 Id. at 255 (noting that the defendant's evidence is sufficient if it raises a genuine
issue of fact as to whether or not the plaintiff was discriminated against).
53 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 807.
54 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
55 Weinstein, supra note 41, at 283, n.10.
56 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
57 Id. at 276. The case involved a teacher who claimed that he had been fired for
exercising his free speech rights. Rd at 274.
5 8 Id. at 287.
59 Id.
6 0 Id.
61 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
62 Id. at 258.
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show that a legitimate reason caused it to decide as it did, then the employer
can avoid all liability, regardless of discrimination. 63
II. THE AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE DoCRn
In any discrimination case, if the employer is to defeat a plaintiff's claim,
evidence of a lawful reason for an employment action is essential. 64 In recent
years, the federal courts have been faced with a new defense in employment
discrimination cases, after-acquired evidence.65 After-acquired evidence is
evidence of employee misconduct that is found by the employer after the
employer terminates the employee, usually during discovery in a lawsuit. 66 The
misconduct can range from pre-hire misrepresentation, such as resume fraud, 67
to post-hire misconduct, such as bad acts while on the job.68 The circuit courts
have differed in their allowance of such evidence; the Sixth and Tenth Circuits
have leaned to the side of the employer, 69 allowing the after-acquired evidence
to serve as a complete defense to the employer's responsibility for restitution. 70
Other circuits addressing this issue, including the Seventh and Eleventh
Circuits, 71 have only allowed such newly-discovered evidence to go to limit a
plaintiff's recovery. 72 Thus, after-acquired evidence can be very valuable to an
63 Id.
64 See Pauline Yoo, The After-Acquired Evidence Docoine, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 219, 222-23 (1993) (noting that in pretext cases and mixed-motive cases, an employer
must present a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its acts).
65 See Rebecca H. White & Robert D. Brussack, The Proper Role of After-Acquired
Evidence in Enployment Discririnnation Litigation, 35 B.C. L. REV. 49, 49 (1993). Most of
the cases dealing with after-acquired evidence have involved claims brought under Title VII
or the ADEA. Id. at 49, n.1.66 Brown, supra note 42, at 381.
67See, e.g., Washington v. Lake County, Ill., 969 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992)
(employee was found to have misrepresented on a job application that he had never been
convicted of a criminal offense); Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409 (6th
Cir. 1992) (employee misrepresented her educational background on her resume).
68 See, e.g., Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir.
1988) (employee faisified claims records while on the job), overuled by McKennon v.
Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).
69 See, e.g., Honeywell, 955 F.2d at 413; Swmers, 864 F.2d at 708.
7 0 See Cheryl K. Zemelman, The After-Acquired Evidence Defense to Employment of
Tie VII and the Contowus of Sodal Responsibility, 46 STAN. L. REv. 175, 176 (1993).
71 See, e.g., Kristufek v. Hussmann Food Serv., 985 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993);
Wallace v. Dunn Constr., 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992), vacated, 32 F.3d 1489 (1994).72 See Zemelman, supra note 70, at 176.
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employer, as it can totally or partially diminish the effect of an employer's
discrimination. 73
In after-acquired evidence cases, courts have had to grapple with several
different aspects of the doctrine.74 Courts have had to decide how the evidence
should be used; the evidence could provide a complete or partial defense to the
suit.75 If the defense is found to be only a partial limit to the plaintiff's
recovery, questions of remedy exist.76 The standard to be followed has also
been an issue;77 courts have struggled over whether the employer has to show
that the employee would have been fired, or would not have been hired;78 the
evidence needed to meet these standards may differ.79
A. Pre-McKennon Approaches to the Use of After-Acquired Evidence
Though after-acquired evidence is a fairly new defense to employment
discrimination claims, 80 use of the doctrine has grown in popularity in a short
time.81 However, use of such evidence varied depending upon the circuit in
73 See Francis I. Connell, III, Emerging Defenses to Employment Discrimination
Claims: After-Acquired Evidence and Stray Remarks, in EMPLOYMENT LrmGATION 1993, at
267 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H-5164, 1993).
74 See Kenneth G. Parker, After-Acquired Evidence in Employment Discrimination
Cases: A State of Disarray, 72 TEx. L. REy. 403, 413 (1993) (noting that several factors
are involved in deciding after-acquired evidence cases, including the type of employee
misconduct at issue, and the standard that the employer needs to meet to defeat the
plaintiffs claim).
75 Compare Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1184 (11th Cir. 1992)
(partial defense), vacated, 32 F.3d 1489 (1994) with Summers v. State Farm Auto. Mut.
Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 709 (10th Cir. 1988) (full defense).
76 See, e.g., Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1181-82. The court settled on the recommendation
that prospective remedies are not available in after-acquired evidence cases, but that back
pay is allowed up until the date that the employer can show by a preponderance of the
evidence that the evidence would have "materially altered" the employment relationship. Id.
77 See Parker, supra note 74, at 413.
78 Compare Washington v. Lake County, IIl., 969 F.2d 250, 257 (7th Cir. 1992)
(standard was whether the employee would have been fired if the resume fraud were
discovered) with Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409, 414 (6th Cir. 1992)
(question was whether an employee would not have been hired without the
misrepresentation on her application).
79 See William S. Waldo et al., Lost Cause and Found Defense: Using Evidence
Discovered After an Employee's Discharge to Bar Discrimination Caims, 9 LAB. LAw. 31,
49 (1993).80 See White & Brussack, supra note 65, at 49.
81 See David D. Kadue, When What You Didn't Know Can Help You: Employers' Use
of After-Acquired Evidence of Employee Misconduct to Defend Wrongful Discharge Cahms,
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which the case is brought.82 Before McKennon, three distinct approaches to the
use of after-acquired evidence existed in the courts. 83
The so-called majority approach to after-acquired evidence held that
evidence of employee misconduct provided a complete defense to the
discrimination claim.84 This approach was most notably exemplified by the
Tenth Circuit's decision in the Swnmers case,85 and has come to be known as
the "Swnmers rule." 86 In Summers, an employee raised age and religious
discrimination claims.87 However, four years later, during discovery, the
employer found that Summers had falsified records in at least 150 instances.88
In granting the employer's motion for summary judgment, the court stated that
even though State Farm may have been guilty of discrimination, Summers'
misconduct was admissible evidence, relevant to his claim.89 The court
compared Summers to one masquerading as a doctor who sues after a wrongful
discharge-the doctor would get no relief, as he was never qualified for the
job.90 Thus, the evidence of Summers' misconduct was found to preclude any
and all relief.91
A less harsh approach to the use of after-acquired evidence was developed
in the Seventh Circuit;92 after-acquired evidence did not preclude all relief, but
limited recovery to back pay, up until the date the evidence was discovered. 93
In Krstufek v. Hussmann Food Service Co., 94 the court held that while resume
fraud precluded any forward-looking recovery, the plaintiff could still receive
back pay up until the actual date that the evidence was discovered. 95 The court
27 BEvERLY HiLS B.A. J. 117, 117 (1993) (noting the increase in reported cases applying
the doctrine within the last five years).82 See Zemelman, supra note 70, at 176.
83 See James G. Babb, Comment, The Use of After-Acquired Evidence as a Defense In
t/e V/Enployment Discrimination Cases, 30 Hous. L. REV. 1945, 1946-47 (1994).
84 See Babb, supra note 83, at 1956; see also Jennifer M. Follette, Complete Jutice:
Upholding the Pnnc'ples of Tle VII Through Appropriate Treatment of After-Acquired
Evidence, 68 WASH. L. Rnv. 651, 651 (1993).
85 Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988),
ovemded by McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).
86 See Follette, supra note 84, at 661.
87 Swmners, 864 F.2d at 702.88 Id. at703.
89 Id. at 708-9.
9 Id. at 708.
91 Id.
92 See Babb, suipra note 83, at 1961.
93 Id.
94 985 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993).
95 Id. at 369-71.
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felt that allowing back pay beyond the date that the employee's misconduct was
discovered would be too punitive towards the employer. 96
A third approach to the use of after-acquired evidence emerged in the
Eleventh Circuit in the case of Wallace v. Dunn Construction.97 In Wallace,
the court found that after-acquired evidence could be used to lessen the
plaintiff's back pay recovery if the employer could prove that it would have
discovered the evidence, regardless of the discrimination suit. 98 The court
rejected the Summers complete defense rationale, but held that the remedies of
front pay and reinstatement were unavailable to a dishonest employee.99
B. The Standards Used in After-Acquired Evidence Cases
In deciding after-acquired evidence cases, courts have had to choose the
standard that the employer must meet when offering the evidence; the employer
has either had to show that had the evidence been known, the employee "would
not have been hired" or "would have been fired.",,O The distinction has been
important to the employer who is trying to use such evidence to cut off the
plaintiff's recovery. 101 How much evidence is needed to defeat a claim has also
been an issue. 10'2
A careful analysis of which standard to apply is found in Washington v.
Lake County, Illinois,03 in which the court rejected the use of a "would not
have been hired" standard in resume fraud casesY°4 The court felt that a
"would have been fired" standard better matched a mixed-motive type analysis,
as an employer must show that it would have made the same decision to
discharge the plaintiff, regardless of his or her protected status. 10 5 The "would
not have been hired" approach was found irrelevant to employees who are
discharged and then found to have been dishonest, because a misrepresentation
may prove immaterial if the employee has proven to be a capable worker.' 0 6
96 Id. at 371.
97 968 F.2d 1174 (1lth Cir. 1992).
98 Id. at 1182.
99 Id. at 1181.
100 See Connell, supra note 73, at 279.
101 See id.
102 See Waldo, supra note 79, at 35-36.
103 969 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992).
104 Id. at 256.
105 Id. at 255; accord McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879,
886 (1995).
106 Washington, 969 F.2d at 254.
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In order to meet a "would have been fired" standard, an employer must
demonstrate several things.' 0 7 The employer must show that the misconduct
occurred prior to termination,108 that the misconduct was unknown to the
employer, 10 9 and that the misconduct was material." 0 The employer can use
affidavits, employee applications, and company discharge policies to prove that
the same decision would have been made, regardless of when the evidence was
discovered. 11I
III. THE BEST APPROACH TO THE USE OF AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE
Of the three approaches to the use of after-acquired evidence, the one that
provides the best solution to the problem is the one created in the Seventh
Circuit and followed by the Supreme Court in McKennon, as it takes into
consideration all the factors involved." 2 This approach, in which after-
acquired evidence can be used only at the remedies stage, allows partial
recovery for discriminatory treatment." 3 This scheme best serves the dual
purposes of deterrence and compensation" 4 and is consistent with prior
employment discrimination cases," 5 including cases decided under the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)," 6 from which employment
discrimination cases have taken their remedies. 117 This approach is also
harmonious with the 1991 Congressional Amendments to Tite VII. 118
A. Consistencies with Antidiscrimination Purposes and Policies
107 See Waldo, supra note 79, at 35-36.
108 See, e.g., Bonger v. American Water Works, 789 F. Supp. 1102, 1106 (D. Colo.
1992); accord Calhoun v. Ball Corp., 866 F. Supp. 473, 475-76 (D. Colo. 1994) (holding
that post-termination employee misconduct cannot be used to preclude recovery).
109 See O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., 12 F.3d 176, 179 (10th Cir. 1994).
110 See Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409, 414 (6th Cir. 1992).
111 See Waldo, supra note 79, at 41.
112 See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 228-29 (1989) (noting that
the plaintiff's right to be free from discrimination should be balanced with the employer's
right to make employment decisions).
113 See, e.g., Kristufek v. Hussmann Food Serv. Co., 985 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993).
114 See Babb, spra note 83, at 1976.
115 See, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 228; Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
116 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
117 See Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419-20 (1975) (noting that
the back pay provisions of the NLRA are the basis for those of Title VII).
118 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified in various sections of 42
U.S.C.).
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The Supreme Court's approach to after-acquired evidence best serves the
policies behind federal antidiscrimination laws such as Title VII and the
ADEA. 119 These statutes were created to combat discriminatory employment
practices.1 20 As well, a discrimination suit should put the plaintiff in the same
position in which he or she was in before the discrimination. 121
The Supreme Court echoed the beliefs of many commentators when it
found that the Swmners rule failed to take into account the goals of
antidiscrimination legislation.122 The Court recognized the public interest in the
enforcement of antidiscrimination laws; a plaintiff is not only suing for his or
her personal vindication, but is also carrying out the congressional policy of
reducing discrimination. 123 The Court found that barring all recovery to a
plaintiff because of after-acquired evidence disserves both the deterrent policies
and make-whole provisions behind federal antidiscrimination laws. 124
The Supreme Court was wise to reject the Swnmers rule, as the rule was
wrong for several reasons. First, the rule allowed evidence that the employer
did not know existed at the time of discrimination to be used against an injured
employee. 125 Second, the Swnmers rule punished the victim/employee for
bringing the suit, 126 as he or she was denied any and all relief. 127 The plaintiff
should not be placed in a worse position for having brought the suit than he or
she would have been absent the discrimination, 128 and that was what the
Suwmers rule did.129 A further problem with Suwners was that the employer
went unpunished for its discriminatory practices.130
119 See Babb, supra note 83, at 1973.
12 0 See Albermarle, 422 U.S. at 417-18.
121 See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285
(1977).
122 See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 884 (1995);
see also Babb, supra note 83, at 1955-60; Brown, supra note 42, at 400-04; Parker, supra
note 74, at 435; Weinstein, supra note 41, at 311-17.
123 See McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 884. The court cited such cases as Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 364 (1977) and Albennarle, 422 U.S. at 415 to
back up its "private attorney general" rationale. Id.
124 McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 884.
125 See, e.g., Follette, supra note 84, at 663; Weinstein, supra note 41, at 306-07.
126 See Follette, supra note 84, at 664.
127 See Babb, supra note 83, at 1960 (noting the harshness of the Swmers rule in
denying all relief to the victim).
128 See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
129 See Weinstein, supra note 41, at 308.
130 See Babb, supra note 83, at 1973-74; Follette, supra note 84, at 663-64;
Weinstein, supra note 41, at 309.
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Those addressing the after-acquired evidence issue have argued that the
Swnmers approach encouraged employers to create low thresholds for
legitimate termination and may have led to employers rummaging around in
employees' pasts for potential flaws.13 1 The Eleventh Circuit worried about the
problem of "sandbagging," in which an employer could hire a member of a
protected class with knowledge of misconduct on the part of that employee,
destroy evidence of that knowledge, treat the employee poorly, and then escape
liability if the employee brings suit because of the employee's past
misconduct. 132 The Supreme Court felt that its approach in McKennon would
not lead to such techniques, as sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and the fact that attorney's fees can be awarded under the
ADEA, would deter sandbagging. 133
The proper solution to the after-acquired evidence problem should balance
the employee's right to be free from discrimination with the employer's right to
make managerial choices. 134 Allowing such evidence to be used only at the
remedies stage of a case, and only allowing back pay up until the date that the
evidence was discovered, strikes the correct balance between the two parties. 135
If the evidence is allowed as a complete defense, then the employer goes
unpunished, and the discrimination goes unredressed. 136 As well, if the
employee is allowed back pay up until the date of judgment or prospective
relief, the employee is better off for having been discriminated against. 137 The
Supreme Court in McKennon felt that allowing back pay up until the date of
discovery both provided redress for the ADEA violation and prevented
infringement of an employer's rights.' 3 8 The Court chose not to allow use of
an "unclean hands" rationale to defeat an employee's claims, as it felt that the
broad remedial purpose of statutes like the ADEA prohibited application of that
equitable doctrine. 139 The Court sought to balance the employer's managerial
131 See Yoo, supra note 64, at 228.
132 Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1180 (11th Cir. 1992), vacated, 32
F.3d 1489 (1994). Sandbagging could be a great problem for groups such as undocumented
workers, as an employer could hire them, pay them less, treat them badly, and be safe from
discrimination suits, due to their illegal status. See Maria L. Ontiveros, To Help Those Most
in Nee& Undocwnented Worker Reports and Remedies Under tle VII, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& Soc. CHANE 607, 616-20 (1994).13 3 McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 887.
13 4 See Parker, supra note 74, at 428-29.
135 See Babb, supra note 83, at 1977.
136 See Samuel A. Mills, Toward an Equitable After-Acquired Evidence Rule, 94
COLUM. L. Ray. 1525, 1539 (1994).137 See Yoo, supra note 64, at 241.
138 McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 886.
139 Id. at 85.
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interests with the employee's interest in invoking the ADEA's
antidiscriminatory policies. 140
Back pay, the preferred remedy in employment discrimination cases, 141
should be awarded to a plaintiff who presents a successful discrimination
case. 142 Granting back pay to plaintiffs does not reward plaintiffs for their
dishonesty or misconduct, but only serves to make victims whole.143
Employees never profit from their bad acts, as they are denied the prospective
relief that honest plaintiffs would most likely receive. 144 The denial of
prospective relief is the key to balancing employer and employee rights; a back
pay-only recovery evens the playing field. 145
B. Consistencies with Prior Antidiscrimination Case Law
The Supreme Court's approach to after-acquired evidence in McKennon is
consistent with prior antidiscrimination case law. The Court found that after-
acquired evidence cases were unlike mixed-motive cases, in that after-acquired
evidence could not be a legitimate motive for an employment decision, since it
was unknown to the employer when the decision was made. 146 However, the
Court did find one aspect of mixed-motive analysis useful; mixed motive cases
"underscore the necessity of determining the employer's motives in ordering
the discharge," which is essential in deciding whether the ADEA has been
violated.147
Commentators addressing the issue of the application of prior Supreme
Court case law to after-acquired evidence cases agree that the mixed-motive
analysis of Mt. Healthy and Price Waterhouse should not be used when
evidence is discovered after-the-fact. 148 Decisions following the Summers
approach149 have been criticized for their failure to take into account the fact
that the nondiscriminatory motive, the after-acquired evidence, does not come
140 Id.
141 See Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975).
142 See Follette, supra note 84, at 668.
143 Id.
144 See Zemelman, supra note 70, at 211.
145 See Brown, supra note 42, at 303.
146 McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 885.
147 Id.
148 See, e.g., Ann M. McGinley, Reinventing Reality-The Impenissible Intruion of
After-Acquired Evidence in itle VII Litigation, 26 CONN. L. REv. 145, 160-61 (1993);
Weinstein, supra note 41, at 305-06.
149 See Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 708 (10th Cir.
1988), overruled by McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).
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to light until after the employer's discrimination has already occurred. 150 Such
decisions disregard Mt. Healthy's rationale that the employer should escape
liability only if it had a legitimate motive to act at the moment of the decision
and that this motive was a "substantial and motivating factor"; 151 it is not
possible for employee misconduct, discovered after the discrimination has
occurred, to fit into the "substantial factor" category. 152
The language of Price Waterhouse bolsters the view that an employer
should not be able to use after-acquired evidence. 153 The Court stated in its
opinion that "an employer may not prevail in a mixed-motive case by offering
a legitimate and sufficient reason for its decision if that reason did not motivate
it at the time of decision." 154 Thus, any reliance by federal courts on the
reasoning of either Mt. Healthy or Price Waterhouse in the context of after-
acquired evidence cases is incorrect; 155 post-hoe rationalization for employment
decisions is not a permissible way to defeat a discrimination claim. 156
The approach followed by the Supreme Court in McKennon, in which an
employee's own misconduct does not lessen the employer's liability for
discri"mination, is thus consistent with precedential employment discrimination
law, as the employer's unlawful acts do not go unnoticed. 157 As well, the
Court's use of the date that the evidence was discovered to end back pay is in
alignment with the policies behind the Mt. Healthy and Price Waterhouse
cases, as the victim is not placed in a worse position for having brought the
lawsuit. 158 The Supreme Court's approach correctly takes into account the
factors involved in antidiscrimination cases, 159 protecting the interests of those
involved in such cases-the employee, the employer, and society as a whole. 160
150 See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 41, at 294-301 (critically analyzing the Sixth and
Tenth Circuits' rationale for following the Summers approach).
151 See Zemelman, supra note 70, at 187.
152 See McGinley, supra note 148, at 148-49.
153 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
154 Id. at 252.
155 See Parker, supra note 74, at 422 (noting that the correct frame of reference for
determining liability is the motive in existence at the time of the employment decision); see
also Zemelman, supra note 70, at 188.
156 See Weinstein, supra note 41, at 306.
157 See White & Brussack, supra note 65, at 95 (praising the Seventh Circuit's
resolution of the issue, on which the Supreme Court's approach is based).
158 See Babb, supra note 83, at 1973-74.
159 See Follette, supra note 84, at 670 (noting that this method of dealing with after-
acquired evidence best serves the deterrent and compensatory goals of antidiscrimination
legislation).
16 0 See Zemelman, supra note 70, at 207.
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In addition to being consistent with prior Supreme Court discrimination
cases, the McKennon approach is consistent with current case law under the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 161 Though the National Labor
Relations Board has changed its view on the issue of whether after-acquired
evidence should be a complete defense to discrimination, 162 current case law
indicates that such evidence should go only to the issue of what remedies are
available to an employee. 163 A recent Supreme Court decision, ABF Freight
Systems v. 1VLRB, 164 in which an employee who falsely testified was still given
damages, ratified the Board's use of after-acquired evidence; the employer's
anti-union animus was of greater consequence than the fact that the employee
had lied. 165
C. Consistencies with the 1991 Amendments to Title VII
In 1991, Title VII was amended166; the 1991 changes made it clear that
even a legitimate motive would not totally bar a plaintiff's recovery if
discrimination had in fact occurred. 167 The 1991 Act provides remedies of
declaratory and injunctive relief to victims, as well as attorney's fees, 168 despite
the employee's own misconduct. 169 However, the bad acts on the part of an
employee can prevent recovery of compensatory and punitive damages. 170
Under the 1991 Act, once a plaintiff has proven that an unlawful factor, such
as gender, race, or religion, has been taken into account by an employer in
making an employment decision, the employer is liable as a matter of law. 171
Though the 1991 Act changed only Title VII, the policies behind the
changes can be applied by analogy to the ADEA, since the two statutes are so
161 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (text of the NLRA, as amended).
16 2 See, e.g., Bird Trucking & Cartage Co., 167 N.L.R.B. 626 (1967) (after-acquired
evidence provides a complete defense to an employee's claim).
163 See, e.g., John Cuneo, Inc., 298 N.L.R.B. 125, 135 (1990).
164 114 S. Ct. 835 (1994).
165 See Robert A. Richardson, The Use of After-Acquired Evidence in Employment
Discraiination Cases, 9 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 97, 116 (1993).
166 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074 (1991).
167 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp. 1 1991) ("Except as otherwise provided in
this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for
any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.").
168 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. I 1991).
16 9 See White & Brussack, supra note 65, at 78-79.
170 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (Supp. 1 1991); see also Mills, supra note 136,
at 1541.
171 See Babb, supra note 83, at 1949.
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similar. 172 The rationale behind the 1991 Act serves only to bolster the notion
that after-acquired evidence should not be a complete defense; 173 the EEOC
recently published guidelines on the new amendments, which make clear that
the amendments do apply to after-acquired evidence cases. 174 Thus, the new
amendments already seem to have eradicated the Summers rule that after-
acquired evidence provides a complete defense to an employee's claim in Title
VII cases. 175 The argument is as follows: if a known, legitimate reason for an
employment decision no longer nullifies an employer's liability for
discrimination, then an unknown, later-discovered legitimate reason cannot
allow an employer's discriminatory acts to go unpunished. 176
IV. CONCLUSION
After-acquired evidence was a problem in need of a solution;
discrimination in employment is prominent in our society, 177 as are reports of
employee fraud and misconduct. 178 Though several approaches to the issue
have been proposed, 179 the correct approach is that followed by the Supreme
Court in McKennon, as it best serves the policies and concerns of federal
antidiscrimination laws. The Supreme Court's approach takes into account all
of the factors involved in after-acquired evidence cases; an employer windfall is
prevented, and discrimination is remedied.' 80 The Court's rejection of the
Summers rule, and its adoption of the Seventh Circuit's approach, truly allows
two wrongs to make a right.
172 See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 883-84
(1995); see also Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978).
173 See Mills, supra note 136, at 1542; Weinstein, supra note 41, at 314.
174 See EEO: Revised Enforcement Guide on Recent Developments in Disparate
Treatment Theory, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 405:6915, 6928 (July 7, 1992). The
guidelines also state that the date of discovery should be used to end back pay.
175 See, e.g., Mills, supra note 136, at 1543; Weinstein, supra note 41, at 315.
176 See Follette, supra note 84, at 667.
177 See Zemelman, supra note 70, at 203.
17 8 See MeGinley, supra note 148, at 204.
179 See supra part I.A.
180 See Babb, supra note 83, at 1977.
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